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Wn.Ls-CoNSTRUCTION-Us:s OF ExnuNsm EVIDENCE-An action for a
declaratory judgment was brought by William C. Borah, Jr. against the Lincoln
Hospital Association and William H. H. Moore. In July 1912, Robert E. Moore
made a will bequeathing $10,000 each to his nieces, Gertrude and Julia Byerly.
Gertrude had been married but her husband and only child died in 1908.
Julia was married and had a son, the plaintiff. In June 1916, testator visited
the nieces and the plaintiff and in December 1916, he added a codicil to his
will reducing the bequests to the nieces to life estates with remainder to "the
child of Gertrude Byerly." In June 1919, the testator, by codicil, increased the
bequests to $15,000 with the same conditions as before. The Lincoln Hospital
Association was residuary legatee and W. Moore was successor trustee. The
purpose of the action was to determine whether the plaintiff or the residuary
legatee was vested with the remainder. The trial court found for tlie residuary
legatee and plaintiff appealed. Held, plaintiff is entitled to the legacy. Extrinsic
evidence can be used to aid in the interpretation of the will. Borah 11. Lincoln
Hospital Assn., (Neb. 1951) 46 N.W. (2d) 166.
A co~ is always permitted, in the interpretation of a will, to hear such
extrinsic evidence of the circumstances as will put it in the place of the testator,
for, until this is done, the court cannot deduce the testator's intent nor discover
whether the instrument is ambiguous.1 Among these circumstances is the condition of the testator's property and the relationship between the testator and
the benefi.ciary.2 The intent of the testator is to be garnered from the whole will
as explained by circumstances and will be given effect if possible.3 Where the
instrument is ambiguous extrinsic evidence will be heard to explain the ambigu-

12 PAGE, WILLS §1415 (1926); 94 A.L.R. 52 (1935); 5 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE
§2470 (1923).
2 In re Painter's Estate, 150 Cal. 498, 89 P. 98 (1907); In re Kurtz's Estate, 190 Cal.
146, 210 P. 959 (1922); Smith v. Garber, 286 ill. 67, 121 N.E. 173 (1918).
3 Warren, ''Interpretation of Wills," 49 HARv. L. R:sv. 689 (1936); 2 PAGE, WILLs
§1414 (1926).
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ity.4 However, a distinction is often made between patent and latent ambiguities, but it is believed this is an unprofitable one; the better view is that extrinsic
evidence is always admissible except for direct statements of the testator's intent
which are permitted only in the case of an equivocation.5 Inaccurate words
may also be interpreted by the doctrine of falsa denwnstratio non nocet6 which
strikes out erroneous and non-essential words in the description and gives effect
to the remainder if that is sufficient.7 However, it is often stated that a clear
meaning cannot be disturbed by extrinsic evidence but this has been rejected
by the modem authorities and is believed no longer to be the law. 8 The will in
the principal case, read in the light of the circumstances, clearly was ambiguous
as was conceded by defendant. The expression "the child of Gertrude Byerly"
was inaccurate and described no one. By striking the erroneous word "Gertrude"9 enough would be left, -aided by extrinsic evidence, to give effect to the
testator's intent. This has been the effect of the decisions in several closely analogous cases.10 It is sometimes criticized as reforming a will for mistake,
which clearly cannot be done,11 but this is not reformation, as the expression
in the will still stands and is given effect through interpretation.12 Therefore,
it is submitted that the decision of the court in the principal case is correct and
in harmony with modem authority although it is regrettable that the court felt
it necessary to continue the distinction between latent and patent ambiguity.

John A. Hellstrom, S.Ed.
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2470 (1923); 94 A.L.R. 44 (1935).
"Interpretation of Wills," 49 HARv. L. REv. 689 (1936); 2 PAGE, WILLS
§1419 (1926); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2470 (1923); THAY.BR, PRELIMINARY TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE 445 (1898).
6 BRooM's LEGAL MAx:rMs 426 (1939). Mere false description does not vitiate, if there
be sufficient certainty as to the object.
7 Warren, ''Interpretation of Wills,'' 49 HARv. L. REv. 689 at 699 (1936); 5 WIG-•
MORE, EVIDENCE §2476 (1923).
8 Warren, ''Interpretation of Wills," 49 HARv. L. REv. 689 at 690 (1936); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2461-63 (1923).
9 Estate of Donnellan, 164 Cal. 14, 127 P. 166 (1912). There is no rule in the construction of wills which prefers a name to a description.
iOJn the Goods of Boehm, [1891] L.R. 16 P. 247; Norton v. Jordan, 360 ill. 419,
196 N.E. 475 (1935); Re Whitty, 30 Ont. Rep. 300 (1899); Mohr v. Harder, 103 Neb.
545, 172 N.W. 753 (1919).
11 Warren, ''Fraud, Undue InB.uence, and Mistake in Wills," 41 HARv. L. REv. 309
at 329 (1927); Dissenting opinion, Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886).
12 Gray, "Striking Words out of a Will," 26 HARv. L. REv. 212 (1912).
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